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Taking a Second Look
at the Second Amendment
and Modem Gun Control Laws
BY DAVID E. JOHNSON*
INTRODUCrION
T he "Great American Gun War"1 rages hotter than ever.
Advocates of gun control decry the excesses of the "gun
culture," which is thought to be unique to the United States,2 and
regularly cite high rates of violent crime that they say are directly
attributable to the widespread sale and ownership of firearms Oppo-
nents of efforts to regulate gun ownership, represented mainly by the
National Rifle Association, point to the Second Amendment4 as a source
* J.D. expected 1998, Umversity of Kentucky.
B. Bruce-Bnggs, The Great American Gun War, PUB. INTEREST 37
(1976), noted in Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original
Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV 204, 206 (1983).
2 In Great Britain, for example, where 3500 gun-related crimes in one year
(as compared to over a million such crimes annually in the United States) are
considered to constitute a "crime wave," many view the American "gun culture"
as an anomaly, rather than the norm. The British Parliament recently took steps
toward a very broad ban on private possession of any kind of handguns, by
passing a law which requires handgun owners to participate m a government buy-
back program. See Otis Pike, Targeting Guns, THE TIMEs-PIcAYuNE (New
Orleans), June 16, 1997, at B5; John Deane, Handgun Ban Outlined in New Bill,
PREss AssOcIATION NEwSFLE, May 22, 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, CURNWS file.
' See, e.g., Government Policies Associated with the Second Amendment:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House of Representatives, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1993) (statement of Edward E. Kallgren), cited in Brannon
P Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted? " Lower Court Interpretations of
United States v. Miller and the SecondAmendment, 26 CUMB. L. REv 961, 964
(1996).
4 "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S.
CONST. amend. II.
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of absolute and inviolable protection of their right to keep and bear
arms.
5
The modem debate focuses on trying to determine the correct
interpretation of the Second Amendment. Two main schools of thought
have dominated recent discourse and scholarslup on the issue, each with
its own conclusions about what the Second Amendment really means.
They are the "states' rights," or "collective rights," school and the
"individual nghts" school. The gun control proponents who constitute the
former group cite the opening phrase of the amendment, along with
subsequent case law, as clear authority that the right was to extend only
so far as necessary for the several states to establish and maintain militias,
and in no way creates or protects an individual right to own arms." In
light of changes m the political climate over the last two centuries and the
rise of National Guard organizations m each state, these people argue that
the Second Amendment is an anachromsm, and that there is no longer a
need to protect any right to private gun ownership. Those on the opposite
side of the question, supporting what has become known as the "Standard
Model,"7 argue that the amendment protects an individual right inherent
in the concept of ordered liberty, and they tend to resist any attempt to
circumscribe such a right.
Upon close analysis, the Second Amendment's language, particularly
when viewed in light of the historical context in which it was drafted,
seems to strongly support the interpretation offered by the "individual
rights" school. The plam language of the Supreme Court's opinion in
United States v. Miller' appears to bolster the argument that the Framers,
by drafting the amendment, intended to protect an already existing
' See Joan Biskupic, NRA, Gun-Control Supporters Take Aim at Swing
Vote, 49 CoNG. Q. 604, 607 (1991).
6 See, e.g., Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Conscious-
ness and Dereliction ofDialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REv 57 (1995). For
a comprehensiverebuttal to the arguments of Herz and other authors who support
the states' rights interpretation, see Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Jr., Under
Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139
(1996).
' For a detailed discussion of the "Standard Model," see Glenn Harlan
Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV 461,
464-88 (1995). For additional discussion of the lstory of the Second Amend-
ment that parallels the arguments of "Standard Model" proponents, see Robert
Dowlut, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms: A Right to Self-Defense Against
Criminals and Despots, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv 25 (1997).
' United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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individual right, rather than create a new one. If this is a valid mterpreta-
tion of the Second Amendment and related case law, it then becomes
important to consider how this affects the interplay between the private
right to own firearms and the states' police power m the area of firearms
regulation. This Note will offer evidence tending to show that the
individual rights interpretation is in fact the correct one.9 When this
conclusion has been satisfactorily established, the discussion will turn to
applying the amendment's proscription against infringement of the right
to keep and bear arms to more recent gun control statutes, particularly the
Brady Bill"0 and the 1994 ban on assault weapons." The final analysis
yields some results which are sure to be controversial."
II. A SECOND LOOK AT THE
ORIGNS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
To establish a credible and defensible position in the Second
Amendment debate, whether for or against gun control, it is absolutely
essential to properly understand the language of the amendment and the
history surrounding its adoption. 3 Obviously, the wording of the
amendment will be the starting point m any attempt at construction, and
the historical context will show the political climate that created the need
for such a provision in the first place. More importantly, this information
provides valuable insight into the intent of the Framers, particularly with
See infra Parts II and I.
10 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat.
1536 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)-(t) (1995)). The United States
Supreme Court, in Pnntz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997), held §
922(s)(2) unconstitutional as violative of the principles of federalism, yet
severable from the Act. As a result, background checks on prospective handgun
purchasers conducted by the chief law enforcement officer ("CLEO") of each
local jurisdiction are no longer mandatory. Instead, these checks are now
performed on a voluntary basis by the CLEOs. See generally Roger K. Lowe,
High Court Shoots Down Key Section ofBrady Law, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
June 28, 1997; Gun Law's Checks Barred, THE NEWS & OBsERvER (Raleigh,
N.C.), June 28, 1997, at Al. See infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
" Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1996 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (v) (1995)).
See mnfra notes 124-38 and accompanying text.
12 See mnfra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
13 For a detailed history of the adoption of the Second Amendment, see




regard to controversial words like "militia" and "the people." When the
modem analyst is equipped with this understanding, it becomes clear that
the "individual rights" interpretation of the 'Second Amendment is the
more persuasive.14
A. The Plain Language of the Second Amendment
If we, two hundred years after the fact, are to understand the intent
behind the drafting of the Second Amendment, a good place to start is
with the language of the amendment itself. By carefully examining the
individual words and phrases, and giving the Framers credit for having
chosen the wording of the amendment with such care as befits its
constitutional significance, the analyst will discover that the whole is
actually about equal to the sum of its parts. The key segments to consider
are the opening clause and the words "militia" and "people."
1. A Quick Grammar Refresher
One key to understanding the substance of the Second Amendment
lies in its grammatical and syntactic structure. Note that there are two
distinct clauses within the sentence, one independent, and one subordi-
nate. "[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed,"15 standing alone, would state unequivocally that the right is
individual in nature, and would leave no room for reasonable dispute.
However, that tricky phrase, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State," 6 seems upon first reading to disturb that
understanding.
Notice, however, the function of this subordinate clause. Collective
rights adherents would argue that it qualifies the rest of the amendment
by placing a limitation on the people's right or a condition precedent on
the existence of the right. If the clause read "To the extent a well
regulated Militia is necessary " this argument might be plausible.
However, no such language exists, nor is it implicit m the rest of the
amendment or in its historical context. 7 Reliance on such an mterpreta-
14 After a detailed analysis of Second Amendment scholarship, history, and
case law, Professor Reynolds, likewise, came to the conclusion that the Second
Amendment more readily supports an "individual rights" interpretation. See
Reynolds, supra note 7
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tion of the subordinate clause would therefore seem unreasonable. The
plain language of the amendment, without regard for attenuated rnferenc-
es therefrom, shows that the function of the subordinate clause is not to
qualify the right, but rather to explain why the right must be protected.
The right exists independent of the existence of the militia, but because
of the need for the militia in preserving the security of a free state, the
people's right must be protected. If this right were not protected, the
existence of the militia, and consequently the security of the state, would
be jeopardized.
2. The Meaning of "Militia"
This brings us to the question of what exactly is the "militia." Gun
control advocates emphasize the opening clause of the Second Amend-
ment to establish their position that the protected right belongs to the
states for the purpose of forming militias (read National Guard umts or
analogous formations"8), rather than to individuals for the purpose of
protecting private ownership of firearms. 9 "A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State," seems fairly self-
explanatory on the surface. However, a superficial analysis often will
produce a misleading conclusion, and it does so here. A common
argument is that this phrase responds to the constitutional authority of
Congress "[tlo provide for organzing, arming and disciplining, the
Militia."20 The problem with this analysis, however, is that it disregards
the clear meaning of the term "militia" as it was understood at the time
the clause was drafted.
In eighteenth century America, the militia was understood to
encompass the whole of the free citizenry 21 The colonists, and later the
independent United States, followed the then-current English practice of
permitting free citizens to keep arms for both military and law enforce-
IS Reynolds, supra note 7, at 475-78.
19 See generally Herz, supra note 6.
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
21 "'Who are the militia? They consist now of the whole people '"
Reynolds, supra note 7, at 473, quoting George Mason, Virginia Debates on
the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTIUTION, AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHIADELPHIA, N 1787, at




ment purposes.2 2 It was the duty of average citizens both to repel foreign
invaders and to provide their own crime control.23 "The 'militia' was the
entire adult male citizenry, who were not simply allowed to keep their
own arms, but affirmatively required to do so."'24 Richard Henry Lee25
also described the militia broadly, and was careful to distinguish it from
a select militia or standing army of regular troops:
"A militia, when properly formed, are in fact the people themselves, and
render regular troops in a great measure unnecessary. [T]he
constitution ought to secure a genuine [militia] and guard against a
select militia, by providing that the militia shall always be kept well
organized, armed, and disciplined, and include all men capable of
bearing arms; and that all regulations tending to render tis general
militia useless and defenceless, by establishing select corps of militia,
or distinct bodies of military men, not having permanent interests and
attachments in the community to be avoided.,
26
It is clear from the distinctions drawn.by Lee that there is no merit
to the argument that the modem National Guard is the "militia' that was
visualized by the Framers. Rather, the National Guard formations of
today fit the category of "select corps of militia, or distinct bodies of
military men" as opposed to the "general militia."'27 References to the
former type of unit were "strongly pejorative,"' while the latter was
seen as the guardian of liberty 29 The distinction likewise was implied by
22 See Kates, supra note 1, at 214.
See id.
24 Id. (alteration in original).
z Richard Henry Lee was one of the more influential voices in the Bill of
Rights debate. He is most famous for hIs Letters ofa Federal Farmer, which are
the source of many of the proposals that later became the substance of the Bill
of Rights and are considered a leading commentary on the meaning of the Bill
of Rights. See HALBROOK, supra note 13, at 70.
26 Id. at 71 (quoting R.H. Lee, Letters of a Federal Farmer (1787-88), in
PA MHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 305-06 (1888)).
27 id.
28 Kates, supra note 1, at 216.
29 See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 13, at 72 (quoting CHARLESTON STATE
GAZETrE, Sept. 8, 1788).
No free government was ever founded, or ever preserved its liberty,
without uniting the characters of the citizen and soldier in those destined
for the defence of the state Such are a well regulated militia,
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Samuel Adams, who stated that "[t]he Militia is composed of free
Citizens. There is therefore no Danger of their making use of their Power
to the destruction of their own Rights, or suffering others to invade
them. 3
0
If one considers the function of the National Guard in modem
America, it seems a fantastic proposition that these so-called "militia"
organizations would ever perform the intended functions of a popular
militia. It is quite conceivable that the National Guard could serve as a
defensive force in the event of an invasion by a foreign army, and these
units already assist in crime control by helping to maintain a modicum of
order during times of not, disaster, or extreme hardship. However, most
would balk at the notion of the National Guard fulfilling the most
important task of a popular militia, i.e., to provide a check on an
oppressive government. Although the National Guard is not a federal
entity, if called upon to offer armed resistance to the federal government,
the members of this "select militia!' would undoubtedly hesitate to do so,
with many of its members likely siding with the federal government out
of a sense of duty as a soldier. In time of revolution, its divided loyalties
would severely hinder its effectiveness as the champion of a free people.
The maintenance and regulation of the popular militia, as envisioned by
the Framers, has fallen by the wayside over the past two centuries as the
American populace has become more prosperous and less afraid of
tyranny But be that as it may, certainly the National Guard as we know
it today could not be what the Framers intended when they used the term
"militia,"31 and by no means can the existence of such units serve as a
justification to deny individual citizens the right to private ownership of
firearms.
3. Power to "the People"
One of the most glaring inconsistencies in the states' rights argument
is illustrated by the very distinct choice of terms between the two clauses
of the amendment. The opening, subordinate clause speaks of "the
security of a free State,,32 which clearly is a reference to the several
states. The independent clause, however, speaks of "the right of the
composed of the freeholders, citizenand husbandman, who takeup arms
to preserve their property, as individuals, and their rights as freemen.30 Id. at 62 (quoting III SAMUEL ADAMS, WRINGs 213 (1906)).
3" For a related discussion of the role of the National Guard, see Reynolds,
supra note 7, at 475-78.
32 U.S. CONST. amend. II (emphasis added).
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people to keep and bear Arms."33 Again, just as we defer to the Fram-
ers' choice of terminology when we construe the Constitution as a whole,
we must likewise give them credit for having drafted the Second
Amendment with equal care. If the right to gun ownership does not
belong to the people, but rather to the states, it seems illogical, or at the
very least confusing, to use language that assigns to the people a right
intended to belong to the states. While the argument may continue by
stating that the term refers to "the people '34 in their collective sense as
constituents of the states, subsequent interpretation of the term m Bill of
Rights jurisprudence severely undermines this position.
Don B. Kates, Jr., in Is extensive analysis of the Second Amend-
ment,35 brings to our attention "another, even more embarrassing
problem for the exclusively state[s'] right[s] interpretation."36 Specifical-
ly, the proponents of this interpretation, and m particular the American
Civil Liberties Umon,37 appear to be very selective and inconsistent with
their interpretation of "the people." They unequivocally state that the term
as it appears throughout the Bill of Rights refers to individual citizens,
with the sole exception of the Second Amendment.38 "To accept such
an interpretation requires the anomalous assumption that the Framers ill-
advisedly used the phrase 'right of the people' to describe what was being
guaranteed when what they actually meant was 'right of the states'
Cumulatively, [these incongruities] present a truly grotesque reading of
the Bill of Rights."'39
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,40 M
holding that Bill of Rights protections do not extend to non-citizens
outside the borders of the Umted States, clarified the intended definition
of the term. "The people" as it appears in the Second Amendment, and
indeed throughout the Bill of Rights, was clearly intended by the Framers
to function as a term of art.41 According to the Court, a consistent
" Id. (emphasis added).
34 Id.
31 See Kates, supra note 1.361Id. at 218.
31 "That bastion of individual rights, the American Civil Liberties Umon -
a member organization of the National Coalition to Ban Handguns - emphatical-
ly demes that the [S]econd [A]mendment has anything to do with individuals."
Id. at 207
38 See id. at 218.
39 Id.
40 United States v Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
41 See id. at 265 ("Contrary to the suggestion of amici curae that the
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interpretation was intended throughout the Bill of Rights. 42 Therefore,
the only logical conclusion that can be drawn is that if the Bill of Rights
generally protects the rights of individual citizens, the Second Amend-
ment specifically protects an individual right.43
B. The Historical Origins of the Second Amendment
The notion that the right to keep and bear arms is individual in nature
takes on additional force when one considers what the Framers under-
stood to be the militia's purpose. This analysis will begin with an
examination of the English militia tradition that was later adopted by the
colonists, and a look at how this tradition was applied by the colonists
during their fight for independence. Last will be a consideration of the
statements of the Framers as they debated the need for a constitutional
amendment to protect the right to private ownership of arms.
1. The English Tradition
In 1670, the English King Charles H1 passed a bill prohibiting all
commoners from owning private arms,' which led to widespread
popular discontent and heated debate M Parliament.4 Andrew Fletcher,
a participant in the English debate, zealously advocated private ownership
of arms as necessary to the continued liberty of free men:
The possession of arms is the distinction between a freeman and a slave
[H]e who thinks he is his own master, and has anything he may
call his own, ought to have arms to defend himself and what he
possesses, or else he lives precariously and at discretion. And though for
a while those who have the sword in their power abstain from doing
him injury; yet, by degrees, he will be awed into submission to every
arbitrary command. Our ancestors, by being always armed, and
Framers used this phrase 'simply to avoid [an] awkward rhetorical redundancy,'
'the people' seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the
Constitution.") (citation omitted).
42 See id.
4 For a similar analysis of the Court's reasoning in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, see also Inge Anna Lansh, Why Annie Can't Get Her Gun:
A Feminist Perspective on the Second Amendment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv 467,
485 nn.136-37
44 See HALBROOK, supra note 13, at 43.
4- See id. at 44-48.
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frequently in action maintained their liberty against encroachments
of their own princes.46
Fletcher saw the vulnerability of an unarmed populace to state tyranny,
noting that "he that is armed, is always, master of the purse of him that
is unarmed."'
The debate resulted in the adoption of the English Bill of Rights in
1689, which included as one of its provisions the right of "the subjects
of England! 4 to carry arms for the purpose of resisting tyranny, but the
right was not limited to use in militias.4 9 The courts, by acquitting those
whose only offense was the possession of a firearm, afftrmed the right as
a liberty allowed by the common law both before and after the enactment
of the Bill. 0 It was during this very period in history that English
settlers were establishing the colomes. They accepted this definition of
their rights5' and carried this tradition with them to the New World. It
was in this vein that the debates were conducted a century later when the
United States adopted its own Bill of Rights.
2. The Amencan Militia Experience
The English tradition was put into practice in the 1770s, as the
colonists took up arms and orgamzed into militias in preparation to meet
the ever-growing threat posed by the standing English army In every
case, the militia was composed of private citizens, each bearing a
privately owned weapon.52 These actions were perfectly consistent with
the common understanding that only an armed citizenry could hope to
impose a check on a tyrannical government and its standing army 5 As
it was then understood, a well regulated militia was "the body of the
46 Id. at 47
41 Id. (quoting A. FLETCHER, POLITICAL WoRKs 6, 7 (1749)).
48 Id. at 54 (quoting I BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *143-44 (St. Geo.
Tucker ed., 1803)). It is interesting to note that this is only a partial concession
by the English crown. The right was not extended to the Irish and Scots due to
their lack of support for English rule, and indeed legislation continued to be
passed in the eighteenth century to disarm these populations. See id. Compare
tis to the ecumemcal scope of the right described in the Second Amendment.
49 See id. at 46.
50 See id. at 49.
"' See id. at 54.
52 See id. at 60.
53 See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 467
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people orgammng themselves into independent companies, each member
furnshing and keeping his own firearms, always ready to resist the
standing army of a despotic state."54
As the crisis intensified, and the government made repeated attempts
to disarm the colomsts, the militia movement gradually spread-and gamed
momentum.
With the spread of "the spirit of revolt" there was "a general rising of
the people!'- "our citizens rose in mass and armed themselves
"In theory and in practice, the American Revolution had both as
an objective and as an indispensible means the individual right to keep,
bear, and use arms to check governmental oppression.55
There is no clearer manifestation of the Framers' attitude toward the
role of the Militia and the private ownership of arms. Their adherence to
the tradition they had inherited from England made it possible for them
to wrest their independence from their oppressors, and was evidence of
the philosophy upon which the government of the new nation would be
founded.
3. Debating the Bill of Rights
There was a common understanding among the Framers, based on the
English tradition, and in light of their own recent experiences, that the
existence of an individual right to own arms was not really a subject for
debate.56 The necessity of gun ownership by a free citizenry was taken
for granted.57 Such an attitude can be attributed at. least in part to a
strong distrust of government among the Framers. For example, George
Mason referred to government as the source of "the most arbitrary and
despotic powers this day upon earth."' Indeed, this notion had been
reflected in the Declaration of Independence itself:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That
54 HALBROOK, supra note 13, at 61 (emphasis added).
55 Id. at 63-64.





to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed, - That whenever
any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it. 59
Alexander Hamilton echoed this sentiment in The Federalist: "If the
representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no
resource left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defence
which is paramount to all positive forms of government ,760 Thus,
it was this right of the people to revolt against an oppressive government
that made indispensable the right of the individual to own arms.
Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike agreed that the individual right
to keep and bear arms was essential to the continued liberty of the newly
established Republic.6' The only real point of contention was whether
the Constitution should include a provision specifically stating the
existence and inviolability of such a right.62 The Federalists believed
that the mere fact that the people were armed would prevent encroach-
ment by the government upon their liberties. 63 "The existence of an
armed populace, superior in its forces even to a standing army, and not
a paper bill of rights, would check despotism."6' Conversely, the Anti-
Federalists believed that without an express articulation of the individu-
al's right, the creation of a select militia or standing army could result m
a general disarmament and subsequent oppression of the populace.65
In any event, there was widespread agreement that the right must be
preserved. The debates even included calls for the adoption of a law that
required every man to be armed.66
59 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
Note that the Framers expressed some suspicion even of the government they
were soon to form, in stating that any form of government was subject to be
abolished if it failed in its essential purpose, i.e., if it failed to secure the rights
of its citizens.
60 THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton).
61 See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
62 See HALBROOK, supra note 13, at 65-66.
63 See id.
6 Id. at 68.
61 See id. at 69.
66 For example, Patrick Henry noted that "[t]he great object is, that every
man be armed Everyone who is able may have a gun." Id. at 74 (quoting
3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEvERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 386 (1836)).
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I. A SECOND LOOK AT THE CASE LAW
The Supreme Court has not often directly ruled on Second Amend-
ment issues. Only once this century, in United States v. Miller,67 has the
Court addressed a constitutional challenge grounded in the Second
Amendment. Since that decision, a number of lower courts have relied on
it to justify an interpretation of the Second Amendment that coincides
with that of the states' rights school.6 The scholarship, noting that the
opimon in Miller is ambiguous at best, raises serious questions as to
whether this decision supports such an interpretation.
United States v. Cruikshankl° is an earlier Supreme Court case
dealing with Bill of Rights issues. Decided in 1875, it deals with the
Second Amendment only indirectly However, Cruikshank lends great
weight to understanding the amendment's applicability It also provides
insight into how the Court viewed the nature of the rights protected by
the Constitution, and should therefore be the initial focus of this analysis.
A. United States v Cruikshank
This case arose during the Reconstruction period and involved a
series of criminal charges against a number of defendants who had
violated section 6 of the Enforcement Act of May 30, 1870. 7' The Act
" United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 174 (1939) (holding that a sawed-
off shotgun was not protected under the Second Amendment because it had no
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated
militia, and was not part of the ordinary military equipment or useful to the
common defense). See infra notes 84-108 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942). United
States v. Warm, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
69 For a detailed analysis of Second Amendment jurisprudence in the wake
of the Miller decision, see Dennmg, supra note 3.
70 United States v Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
7' That if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go
in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another,
with intent to violate any provision of this act, or to injure, oppress,
threaten, or mtimdate any citizen with intent to prevent or hinder his
free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured
to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of
his having exercised the same, such persons shall be held guilty of
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be fined or imprisoned, or both,
at the discretion of the court, - the fine not to exceed five thousand
1997-98] 209
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was intended to protect the constitutional rights of the recently freed
black population by imposing criminal penalties on anyone who "banded"
or "conspired" together for the purpose of infringing upon those rights.72
The Supreme Court, in determining whether this case was correctly
brought under the Act, noted that
[t]o bring this case under the operation of the statute, therefore, it must
appear that the right, the enjoyment of which the conspirators intended
to hinder or prevent, was one granted or secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States. If it does not so appear, the criminal matter
charged has not been made indictable by any Act of Congress.73
The clear implication was that the Court's decision would hinge on
whether the hindered right found its origin or guarantee in federal or state
law. The Court went on to discuss in detail the nature of our federal
system, focusing on the distinctions between the sovereignties that exist
at the state and federal levels.74 It noted that "[t]he people of the United
States resident within any State are subject to two governments: one State
and the other National; but there need be no conflict between the two.
The powers which one possesses, the other does not."'75 Such a duality
of citizenship requires duality of obedience to the laws of each respective
sovereign, but likewise creates separate attributes of citizenship which
allow the citizen to "demand protection from each [government] within
its own jurisdiction."76
In discussing the separate jurisdictions of the state and national
governments, the Cruikshank Court emphasized that the government of
the Umted States can only exercise the powers expressly delegated to it
by the Constitution, and that all other powers are reserved to the people
or the states. Moreover, "[n]o rights can be acquired under the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States; except such as the Government of the
dollars, and the impnsonment not to exceed ten years, - and shall,
moreover, be thereafter ineligible to, and disabled from holding, any
office or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or
laws of the United States.
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
72 See id.
13 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 549 (emphasis added).
' See id. at 549-51.
'5d. at 550.76Id. at 551.
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United States has the authority to grant or secure. All that cannot be so
granted or secured are left under the protection of the States."'
The Court held in favor of the defendants with respect to the Bill of
Rights issues on the notion that the rights with which the defendants
intended to interfere were not, in law or in fact, granted or secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States." The Bill of Rights expressly
prohibits federal government from infringing upon certain liberties, but
is not otherwise a vehicle for granting or securing such rights.79 More-
over, the Bill of Rights applies only to the national government, and not
to the several states. 0 "For their protection in [the] enjoyment [of these
rights], the people must look to the States. The power for that
purpose was originally placed there, and it has never been surrendered to
the Umted States.""
The right to keep and bear arms is protected by the Bill of Rights
against infringement by Congress. Cruikshank reveals that this right
existed before the foundation of the federal government, not as a
consequence thereof. Moreover, this right was not surrendered. to the
federal government. The Second Amendment is, of course, one segment
of the Bill of Rights, and is thus encompassed by the Cruikshankholding.
More specifically, the Second Amendment was the basis for two counts
in the petitioner's claim and was directly addressed in the opinion. 2 The
77 Id.
78 See Id. at 550-52.
79 See id. at 551.
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes
existed long before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States
It was not, therefore, a right granted to the people by the
Constitution. The Government of the United States, when established,
found it in existence, with the obligation on the part of the States to
afford it protection.
Id.
'0 See id. at 552.
The First Amendment to the Constitution prohibits Congress from
abridging "the right of the people to assemble and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." This, like the other amend-
ments proposed and adopted at the same time, was not intended to limit
the powers of the State Governments in respect to their own citizens,
but to operate upon the National Government alone.
Id.
81 Id.
82 See id. at 553.
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Court stated that "[the right to bear arms] is not a right granted by the
Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument
for its existence. The Second Amendment declares that it shall not be
infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not
be infringed by Congress." 3 In other words, these are natural rights;
they were not arbitrarily created by the adoption of the Bill of Rights and
are not subject to judicial revocation or to eradication by a repeal of the
Second Amendment, contrary to what the states' rights position implies.
After the Court decided that the Constitution was not the source of
the right to keep and bear arms, but merely a means of preventing
Congress from infringing upon that right, it was only a matter of time
before the limits of the right would be tested. It was not until 1939 that
the Supreme Court was called upon to decide just how far the right
extended.
B. United States v Miller84
United States v. Miller, decided nearly six decades ago, left open the
question of how the Supreme Court interprets the nature of the right
protected by the Second Amendment. A number of lower court decisions
have interpreted Miller to reject the existence of an individual right.85
It is unclear, however, how those courts came to that conclusion, because
the case's holding actually seems to lean in the opposite direction.
Jack Miller and Frank Layton were indicted for unlawfully transport-
ing an unregistered firearm in interstate commerce, in violation of the
National Firearms Act.86 The weapon in question was a double-barrel
sawed-off shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches in length,
83 Id. Professor Donald W Dowd, in his recently published effort to
discredit the individual rights argument, summarized the holding in Cruikshank
by simply saying "the Court held that the Second Amendment created no right
to keep or bear arms." Donald W Dowd, The Relevance of the Second
Amendment to Gun ControlLegslation, 58 MONT. L. REv 79, 80 (1997). While
this may be true, it tells only half the story and is misleading. Dowd ignores the
Court's pronouncement that the existence of the right to keep and bear arms
predated the adoption of the Amendment, rather than being created thereby.
84 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
85 For an analysis of these other decisions, see Denning, supra note 3, at
972-76.
86 26 U.S.C. § 1132 etseq. (1934) (recodifiedin 1954 as 26 U.S.C. § 5801
et seq.).
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ownership of wich was prohibited by the Act." The defendants
challenged the mdictment on the ground that it offended the Second
Amendment's prohibition against infringing on the right to keep and bear
arms.88 The district court agreed and quashed the indictment but the
Supreme Court reversed on direct appeal.8 9
The Court's holding focused on the lack of evidence to show any
"reasonable relationship [of the shotgun] to the preservation or efficiency
of a well regulated militia. 09 The Court wrote that it could not "say
that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such
an instrument [the sawed-off shotgun],"'" because "it [was] not within
judicial notice that this weapon [was] any part of the ordinary military
equipment or that its use could [have contributed] to the common
defense."92 In support of its holding, the Court then launched into a
detailed historical analysis of the purpose and composition of the militia,
as well as of a number of state provisions for the establishment there-
of.93 The Court raised a number of interesting points in its analysis that
strongly undermine any interpretation of this decision as a rejection of the
individual right to own firearms. In formulating their interpretation,
states' rights proponents apparently rely on one particular paragraph
within the opinion, which states:
The Constitution as originally adopted granted to the Congress power
- "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia "With obvious
purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness
of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment
were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.94
Once again, however, reliance on this statement to support a states'
rights interpretation is misplaced, because it assumes a "National Guard"
definition of the militia, and further fails to account for several essential
factors.
87 See id. § 1132(a); Miller, 307 U.S. at 175.
88 See Miller, 307 U.S. at 176.
89 See id. at 177
90 Id at 178.
91 Id.
92Id.
" See id. at 180-82.94 Id. at 178.
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The first failing of the states' rights interpretation is that it completely
discounts the remainder of the opinion, which repeatedly cites historical
provisions requiring individual members of the militia to privately own
the firearms they were to use to perform their military duties. For
example, the Court detailed laws of the states of Massachusetts,9' New
York,96 and Virgima97 that plainly required members of the militia to
appear for muster bearing their own firearms." It seems illogical to
require private ownership of firearms, while at once denying the
individual the right to such ownership. In other words, if the militia is to
be armed, the individual must first be armed.99 Note that the purpose
ascribed to the enactment of the Second Amendment was "to assure the
continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces.""
Again, if there is no individual right to own firearms, it follows that the
general populace ought to be disarmed. This, however, clearly defeats the
intention to draw on the common citizenry to form the militia.. The only
way to "assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness" of
the militia is to provide for an armed citizenry "'
" See id. at 180 (" 'That every non-commissioned officer and private soldier
of the said militia shall equip himself, and be constantly provided with a
good fire arm, etc."' (quoting General Court of Massachusetts, January Session
1784) (emphasis added)).
96 See id. at 181 ("'That every Citizen so enrolled [in the militia] and
notified, shall, within three Months thereafter, provide himself, at his own
Expense, with a good Musket or Firelock "' (quoting New York Legisla-
ture, an Act passed April 4, 1786) (emphasis added)).
17 See id. at 181-82 ("'Every officer and soldier shall appear at his
respective muster-field on the day appointed. armed, equipped, and accoutred
And every of the said officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates,
shall constantly keep the aforesaid arms ready to be produced whenever
called for by his commanding officer. "') (quoting General Assembly of Virgima,
October, 1785 (12 Hening's Statutes)).
98 See id. at 179-80 ("'In all the colomes, as in England, the militia system
was based on the principle of the assize of arms. This implied the general
obligation of all adult male inhabitants to possess arms, and. cooperate in the
work of defence. A year later [1632] it was ordered that any single man who
had not furimshed himself with arms might be put out to service '" (quoting
HERBERT L. OSGOOD, Tim AMERIcAN COLONIES IN THE 17TH CENTURY (1930)).
99 See Kates, supra note 1, at 217 ("The personally owned arms of the
individual were the arms of the militia.").
100 Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
101 Id.
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In addition to this oversight, there is a second serious flaw in the
states' rights interpretation of Miller- a total disregard of the basis of the
Court's ruling. The defendants' cause was not defeated because they
lacked an individual right to own firearms.0 2 If such was the case, the
Court, logically, would have relied upon that interpretation of the Second
Amendment to dispose of the claim. However, the Court did not even
remotely hint at such a notion. Rather, it assumed the existence of the
basic right and examined the characteristics of the particular weapon to
determine if it fell within the scope of the right. Thus the Court stated:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use
of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at
this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instru-
ment.1
03
The defendants lost because the weapon for which they claimed
constitutional protection was not sufficiently related to "the preservation
or efficiency of a well regulated militia," nor was it "part of the ordinary
military equipment," the use of which "could contribute to the common
defense."'" The sole reason the Court refused to extend Second
Amendment protection to Miller's sawed-off shotgun was that it was not
a military-style weapon. There is a very clear implication in the opinion,
ignored by states' rights advocates, that as long as there is sufficient
evidence that a particular weapon is of the type normally associated with
military use, it will come within the Second Amendment's protective
power. 105
Let us summarize what can be gleaned from these two cases. First,
Cruikshank clearly states that the individual liberties protected by the Bill
of Rights are not dependent on that document for their existence, but
rather are natural rights whose existence predates the founding of the
government."°6 Second, Miller provides strong support to the position
102 See id. at 178-82.
103 Id. at 178.
104 rd.
115 Certain large weapons, such as rocket launchers and cannons, would pass
the Miller test but are nevertheless excludedfrom Second Amendment protection.
See infra notes 124-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale
underlying this limitation.
106 See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
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that an individual's right to own firearms must be preserved in order to
"assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness" of the
militia." 7 Absent an individual right to own firearms, the militia would,
for all practical purposes, cease to exist. Moreover, the Miller Court laid
out a test for extending Second Amendment protection to a particular
weapon: whether it bears some reasonable relationship to the preservation
and efficiency of a well regulated militia, is of the type normally found
in the military equipment, and is useful for the common defense.'l 8 The
focus of the analysis is on the nature of the weapon for which protection
is claimed, not on the nature of the right.
IV A SECOND LOOK AT MODERN GUN CONTROL STATUTES
It is clear from this trek through grammar, history, and case
interpretation that the Second Amendment was intended to protect an
individual's right to keep and bear arms. As shown in the preceding
sections, any analysis at more than a superficial level quickly undermines
arguments to the contrary To bring this discussion into sharper focus,
however, and to make it relevant on more than a purely academic level,
the remaining portion of this Note will consider how some modem gun
control laws would stand up to Second Amendment challenges brought
against a backdrop of this interpretation. This analysis will center on two
controversial statutes enacted in recent years: the 1993 Brady Bill0 9
and the ban on assault weapons that was included in the Public Safety
and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act."0
A. The Brady Bill
In 1993, Congress passed the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act,"' more commonly known as the Brady Bill. The stated purpose
107 See supra notes 84-105 and accompanying text.
'0' See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
... Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat.
1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)-(t) (1995)). A portion
of the Brady Bill was held unconstitutional recently in Prntz v. United States,
117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). For a brief discussion on the Supreme Court's holding,
see supra note 10.
.. Public-Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1996 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)
(1995)).
" Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat.
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of the measure was "[t]o provide for a waiting period before the purchase
of a handgun, and for the establishment of a national instant criminal
background check system to be contacted by firearms dealers before the
transfer of any firearm.'.. 2 In general, the law requires prospective
handgun purchasers to provide personal identity information.. and a
statement of eligibility" 4 to the seller, who is m turn obligated to
submit the information to the chief law enforcement officer? 5 of the
place of residence of the prospective purchaser." 6 The chief law
enforcement officer must make a reasonable effort to ascertain within five
business days whether receipt or possession by the purchaser would be
in violation of the law."7 Only if the check of the purchaser's back-
ground yields a "clean" report can the transfer of the firearm be
completed."'
This raises the question of whether this statute would withstand a
Second Amendment challenge as a valid exercise of Congress's regulato-
ry authority, or whether it imposes an unlawful infringement on the
individual's right to keep and bear arms. Fairly simple analysis leads to
the conclusion that the Brady Bill does not frustrate the Second Amend-
ment with regard to ownership of individual firearms, and indeed may
even be considered to enhance its purposes. While the federal govern-
ment, due to the limitations of federalism, can no longer require the states
to perform these checks, most states have chosen to continue participating
in the background check program on a voluntary basis.'19
1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)-(t) (1995)).
112 Id., H.R CoNF. REP. No. 103-412, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
113 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(3) requires the following information-to be provided
for the purpose of conducting a criminal background check: name, address, and
date of birth on a valid identification document bearing a photograph of the
transferee, and a description of the type of identification used.
114 Section 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(I) requires a statement that the purchaser is not
under indictment for, and has not been convicted m any court of, a crime
pumshable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; is not a fugitive from
justice; is not an unlawful user of, or addicted to any controlled substance; is not
mentally impaired; is not an illegal alien; and has not been dishonorably
discharged from the armed forces.
15 Section 922(s)(8) defines "chief law enforcement officer" as "the chief of
police, the sheriff, or* an equivalent officer or the designee of any such
individual."
116 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(IV).
117 See zd. § 922(s)(2).
118 See id. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)(H).
19 See supra note 10.
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First, the right to own arms is not mfiniged by this statute. The
imposition of a five-day waiting period may delay the gun purchase, but
it would not, m itself, prevent it. The end result, despite the arguments
of those who oppose the measure, is that those who pass the crinmal
background check will not be denied the right to purchase a firearm
under this statute. But what, for example, of those who are denied
permission to buy a handgun because of a criminal record or drug
addiction?
It would appear at first glance that the right of such persons to
firearm ownership was being violated, but a challenge by such an
individual would likely fail because the Framers, in protecting the right
to bear arms, intended more than just the preservation of the citizen
militia. Another clearly stated purpose for individual gun ownership was
the usefulness of private arms for law enforcement and crime control.
Glenn Reynolds and other adherents to the Standard Model:
stress that the right to keep and bear arms was seen as serving two
purposes. First, it allowed individuals to defend themselves from
outlaws of all kinds - not only ordinary criminals, but also soldiers and
government officials who exceeded their authority, for in the legal and
philosoplucal framework of the time no distinction was made between
the two.120
It is also important to note that in eighteenth-century America, no police
forces existed as we know them today 121 Moreover, the courts have
repeatedly held that the function of the police is to deter crime in general,
but not to protect individuals.12
Given this emphasis on the right (or possibly the duty) of the
individual to keep arms to protect himself and others against criminals,
it is perfectly consistent with the intent of the Framers to pass laws to
keep firearms out of the possession of criminals. Indeed, according to
Kates:
[Tihe concept of a right to arms was inextricably and multifariously tied
to that of the "virtuous citizen." One implication of this emphasis
120 Reynolds, supra note 7, at 467; see also Lansh, supra note 43, at 481
("The framers were heirs to an Anglo-Norman legal tradition which required free
men to keep arms to defend the realm and suppress crime.").
121 See Lansh, supra note 43, at 487-88.
122 See, e.g., id. at 487 (citing Bowers v DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir.
1982)).
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on the virtuous citizen is that the right to arms does not preclude laws
disarming the unvirtuous citizens (i.e., criminals) or those who, like
children or the mentally unbalanced, are deemed mcapable of vir-
tue.
23
In short, the Brady Bill, because it is intended not to mterfere with the
individual's right to keep and bear arms, but to prevent arming criminals,
is not m conflict with the spirit of the Second Amendment and thus
would withstand a constitutional challenge under an individual rights
interpretation of the amendment.
B. The Assault Weapons Ban
124
In determining the validity of the assault weapons ban, it is necessary
to return to the analysis of United States v. Miller 125 Miller stands for
the proposition that whether ownership of a particular firearm is protected
under the Second Amendment is to be determined based on its relation
to the preservation of the militia, whether it is part of the standard
military equipment, and whether it is useful to the common defense. 26
Since assault weapons by their very nature are military weapons, they are
precisely the type of weapons that the Second Amendment was intended
to protect, so that militia members would have them available whenever
the need should arise. For example, the Colt AR-15, which is not
included on the list of weapons exempted from the assault weapons
ban, "'27 is the commercial equivalent of the M-16 series assault rifle,
which is currently the basic weapon used throughout the United States
armed forces. If the M-16 is suitable for military or militia use, then
certainly the AR-15 is, also. The AR-15 clearly passes the Miller test
based on its functional characteristics, and therefore its possession by
.private citizens should-be deemed protected by the Second Amendment.
The position of the National Rifle Association, that the right to keep
and bear arms protects the hunter, the collector, and the competitive
shooter, is contrary to what the Framers intended.'28 Hunting rifles and
3 Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 146 (1986).
124 Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1996 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1995)).
'2 See supra notes 84-108 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
127 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(1).
128 See generally David B. Kopel & Christopher C. Little, Communitanans,
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match pistols are not the type of arms with which a militia could
reasonably expect to offer meaningful resistance to a standing army In
other words, these types of firearms fail the Miller test, because they are
not a part of the standard military equipment, useful for the common
defense, nor do they bear any reasonable relationship to the preservation
and efficiency of the militia. A militia, to be effective in its intended role,
must be equipped at a level at least approaching that of its opponent. The
regular armed forces are typically armed with assault rifles and automatic
weapons, and it makes little sense to expect the militia to stand against
a force in relation to which it is woefully underequipped. This is
analogous to an expectation that the rebellious coloists of the 1770s turn-
out with sabers and spears to face the muskets of the British.'29 The
assault weapons ban is therefore unconstitutional to the extent that it
proscribes ownersip of weapons that bear a reasonable relationship to the
preservation and efficiency of the militia, which are part of the standard
military equipment, and which are useful for the common defense.
Tis raises the counterargument that if Miller is carned to its logical
extreme, it should extend constitutional protection to all types of military
weapons, including rocket launchers, heavy-barrel machine guns, artillery
pieces, etc. Certainly the Framers could not have intended that private
citizens be allowed to own such weapons. While there seems to be some
merit to this argument, there actually is very little basis for such
concerns. It is quite unlikely that someone asserting the right to own a
flamethrower based on the holding in Miller would find much support in
the Supreme Court. The Court would use the clear implications of Miller
to defeat that claim. The Court cited several examples of early militia
statutes that specified the type of arms the citizen-soldiers were expected
to bring to muster. 130 The equipment described included "a 'good fixed
musket a sword, rest, bandoleers, one pound of powder, twenty
bullets, and two fathoms of match;"'' "'a good Musket or Firelock,
a sufficient Bayonet and Belt, a Pouch with a Box therein to contain not
less than Twenty-four Cartridges;""" and "'a good, clean musket
a cartridge box a good knapsack and canteen ,,,3 In other
Neorepublicans, and Guns: Assessing the CaseforFirearms Prohibition, 56 MD.
L. REv 438 (1997).
129 See Kopel & Little, supra note 128, at 520-22.
130 See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 180-82 (1939).
131 Id. at 180 (quoting OSGOOD, supra note 98).
'
32 Id. at 181 (quoting New York Legislature, an Act passed April 4, 1786).
m Id. (quoting General Assembly of Virginia, October, 1785 (12 Henig's
Statutes)).
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words, these statutes clearly imply that the "arms" to be kept and borne
by the members of the militia were those typically carried by the average
foot soldier m a standing army Based on this limited construction of the
term "arms," it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would ever extend
the holding m Miller to encompass heavy weapons or weapons of mass
destruction."'
Don B. Kates also expressed concern that a reading of Miller that
focuses solely on the military nature of a weapon would lead to absurd
results.135 Such a reading, without further qualification, would justify
private ownership of tanks and rocket launchers. He resolves this problem
by reformulating the Miller test'36 in light of subsequent case law to
produce a three-part test that considers the whole intent of the Framers
m adopting the Second Amendment. Kates' test is intended to compensate
for "Miller's conceptually flawed concentration on the amendment's
militia purpose, to the exclusion of its other objectives."' 37 The test
suggested by Kates' interpretation of post-Miller decisions would require
a weapon to "provably be (1) 'of the kind in common use' among law-
abiding people today; (2) useful and appropriate not just for military
purposes, but also for law enforcement and individual self-defense, and
(3) lineally descended from ihe lands of weaponry known to the
Founders., 13' Applying this more detailed and focused test, weapons
like howitzers and flamethrowers are found to be excluded from the
protection of the Second Amendment.
CONCLUSION
While the analysis in tls Note may not find much support or
sympathy among advocates of the states' rights interpretation, it is
undemable that there is a wealth of evidence available to support the
conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to
firearms ownership. From statements made by the Framers during their
debates, from the historical context in which they made their decision,
and from the way they chose to exercise private arms ownership during
their struggle for independence, it is clear that this is the intended result.
134 For additional discussion and analysis of what kind of weapons are
protected by the Second Amendment, see Reynolds, supra note 7, at 478-80.
See Kates, supra note 1, at 249 n.192.
136 See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.




Likewise, the National Rifle Association and like-minded gun ownership
advocates may be uncomfortable with the idea that the individual rights
interpretation of the Second Amendment - the interpretation they favor
- gives full justification to the Brady Bill'39 and does not support the
NRA's traditional position regarding ownership of guns used for hunt-
Ing.1
40
If the individual rights interpretation were unequivocally adopted by
the Supreme Court, gun control advocates would undoubtedly question
the wisdom of declaring the assault weapons ban unconstitutional. While
the fear of having assault weapons on the streets is justifiable, and the
tales of innocent victims who have been killed or maimed by heavily
armed criminals is worthy of sympathy, a different way must be found
to tackle this problem. Thugs and gang members should not have access
to highly lethal, military-style firearms, as even the Framers would
agree,' 4' but the assault weapons ban is not the right answer. To
disregard the Framers' clear intent on such a fundamental right would
undermine the legitimacy of the Constitution as a whole, and would pave
the way for "creative interpretation" of its other provisions, including the
other basic protections afforded by the Bill of Rights. Moreover, in this
age of growing distrust of our mammoth federal government, this would
be a dangerous step toward effectively disarming the general militia by
depriving it of weapons that would offer a small measure of parity with
the forces that it would, at least in theory, be expected to oppose. The
idea of an armed revolution in this country may seem farfetched, but
nevertheless it is a contingency for which the Framers, in their wisdom,
saw fit to plan. While today it may seem worth the cost to provide a
quick solution to our nation's crime woes by circumventing these
protections, in the final analysis we the people will find that the price will
be higher than we are willing to pay
' See supra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
140 See text accompanying supra note 126.
... See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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